Can Ukraine engage with Trump from a position of strength? Here are four key points by Igar Tyshkevich.

So, the first round of consultations between Russia and the USA has taken place. In the Ukrainian information space, the mere fact and some of the "voiced theses" have provoked a sharply negative reaction. However, few pay attention to the fact that a number of theses were articulated by Moscow. We should not forget about Russia's developments in the field of information operations, as well as our failures in this area from late 2022 to the present day.

Four Important Theses

We now have an outline of the Kremlin's position as a result of the consultations, and there has been a rather passive denial from the White House. This is logical, considering Zelensky's refusal to sign the proposed US agreement on subsoil resources (which is a reasonable refusal, it should be noted). Consequently, we are being attacked in the information space by Russia and… the USA as well. To be honest, this is predictable for me — in December, I presented a forecast for 2025, and the first cycle of pressure "according to Trump's plan" is described in this document. At this stage, Ukraine can say "no." This is the first thing to keep in mind in the coming weeks — there will be more than enough negative information waves.

The second thesis to remember is that consultations are underway, not negotiations. This means that the parties (in this case, the USA and Russia) are conducting a sort of verification of their maximum demands from each other. The issue of Ukraine is one of the key points, but far from the only one. The Kremlin's task is to broaden the dialogue, adding as many topics as possible. In exchange for concessions on secondary issues for themselves, they aim to demand concessions on key matters. This is logical. And the field is being defined. However, when we talk about Ukraine, even a stable ceasefire cannot be guaranteed solely by Russia and the USA. There is the EU, there is China (and Trump acknowledges that this state will be involved), and there are other countries. We are at the initial stage of an entire cycle of consultations.

The third thesis is the prioritization of problems. For Trump, the number one issue is competition with China. This is not about an arms race, but rather a civilizational dispute and, at the same time, a dialogue about the future world order. Where there is a place for both Beijing and Washington at the center of the system, but neither capital wants to see Moscow on equal terms with them. As a strong regional player — yes. As one of the world centers — unlikely. Trump's attempts to engage with Putin largely represent the policy of preventing Russia from becoming a junior partner and raw material appendage of China. In simpler terms, using Russia as a competitor to China in several regions. Therefore, from Trump's perspective, the war needs to be frozen, and Russia gradually removed from sanctions. (By the way, I wrote in detail about this in 2023 in the report "Scenarios for Ending the War.")

The fourth thesis is that Trump actively speaks about US interests and tries to impose a businessman’s logic on politicians, expecting a quick return on his investments. He has the right to do so. However, he is successful only as long as he is not played against in the same game.

And here we come to the question raised in the title — can Ukraine play with Trump to raise the stakes, in some way from a position of strength?

At this point, part of the audience might smile and suggest looking at economic statistics, demographics, and so on. Another part will assert that, for instance, Zelensky's position already represents an attempt to play from a position of strength. I will disappoint you. When it comes to the position of the Ukrainian authorities, their actions can be summed up in two words: "we are offended." At least because Ukraine is trying to respond to the statements and actions of the USA, frightening them (and the EU countries) with the negative consequences of concessions to Russia. And not attempting to assess the interests of other states in the region and play on them. This already answers the first part — even a weak player can skillfully attempt to outplay the interests of stronger partners.

At this stage, we come up against the list of such players. And it is worth paying attention to several major economic and political projects in the region. For instance, in the report "The Future of the Black Sea: Scenario Analysis", I attempted to evaluate the possibilities of implementing global projects in the Black Sea region through the lens of scenarios for ending the war. I continued this logic in several posts regarding Indian initiatives. And it was easy to identify a group of countries that are extremely disadvantaged by the strengthening of Russia in the region and the world.

Countries That Do Not Benefit from Putin's Triumph

If we refer to the discourse supported here, these should be the EU and US states. But again, we recall the consultations in the UAE. There are several countries that, against the backdrop of Russia's weakening positions and the deconstruction of the world system, have taken a course toward their own strengthening. Among their interests, there is a place for Ukraine’s interests. In particular:

1. Turkey. The country aims to become a regional superpower. And it already effectively is one. Ankara intends to become the dominant military and economic force in the Black Sea. It is already implementing several large-scale projects, in which there is no room for Russia's significant strengthening. In particular:

1.1. The Istanbul Canal — a channel from the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea, which not only expands logistics opportunities but also allows Ankara to take a strong position on maintaining or changing the Montreux Convention. At least because the man-made canal is not a strait, while the convention concerns straits. This project is tied to ideas for expanding the southern overland route of the "Belt and Road" — a Turkish-Chinese project aimed at creating a real alternative for China to the "Russian route." Plans are also connected to Turkey and Azerbaijan to expand the export capabilities of Caspian oil, including through ports in Georgia. The implementation of both projects weakens Russia's influence in the region. And for this reason, the Kremlin actively opposes it, for example, by influencing politics in Georgia.

1.2. The Turkish initiative for a land corridor from the ports of the Persian Gulf through Iran and Syria to the Mediterranean and Black Seas. This is already a logistics project in which the Arabian monarchies are interested, and even, partially, India (although it has announced its own initiative — more on that later). Again, we encounter the balance of power in the Black Sea, as well as Ukraine's potential to be a transit hub for goods to the North and navigation along the Danube. Russia has been "asked" to leave the Danube Commission, but freezing the war on its own terms would allow the Kremlin to regain positions. This means it would try to influence the implementation of this Turkish initiative.

1.3 Turkey's bonuses as a gas and oil hub. Just in the last three weeks, news has emerged about the beginning of Turkish gas supplies to the EU through Iran and Turkey. This allows Azerbaijan to obtain real volumes of gas for potential transit through the Ukrainian gas transmission system. The topic of building a gas pipeline from Qatar through Syria to Turkey is also being discussed (in the Turkish and Qatari press). Naturally, the EU's return to the policy of purchasing maximum volumes of Russian gas and oil puts a damper on such plans.

1.4 Turkey and the "Turkish World." Ankara has actively engaged in cultural diplomacy and support for Turkic peoples. This is viewed as a mechanism for expanding Turkish influence. While Turkey does not openly conflict with Russia, we already see the beginnings of clashes between Turkish and Russian interests in Abkhazia (I understand this is part of Georgia, but the specificity of the policy needs to be highlighted), Georgia, and Gagauzia. While Russia is under sanctions and needs at least the neutrality of Turkey, Ankara can pursue a policy of increasing its influence. If Russia emerges as the "winner," it is unlikely.

2. India with its logistics initiatives. You may have heard of the "North-South" corridor that runs through Russia. The specifics of its implementation "on the ground," by the way, have become one of the reasons for major problems for Armenia. However, if the Russian understanding sees the corridor ending in St. Petersburg, the Indian perspective is that it should be a route from India to the Baltic and Scandinavian states. The project is being implemented but slowly. And India is now focusing on a railway project from the ports of the Persian Gulf to the ports of Israel and Lebanon. Russia is interested in dominating the "North-South" project and may destabilize the region again in the event of its "victory." Again, a conflict of interests. And also opportunities for Ukraine. After all, from the ports of Israel and Lebanon, it is very convenient to organize the delivery of goods to the ports of "Greater Odessa," with further transportation to the borders of Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. (In the future — adding the Danube and, with a change in policy in Belarus, a route to the Baltic states). This is a project that is important for us and extremely undesirable for Russia.

3. Norway and Canada — countries for which Russia's success poses colossal risks. We are talking about the Arctic and the implementation of northern maritime routes. Moreover, these mentioned countries can act as opponents of both Russia and the USA. Just the other day, Russia