Condemning commanders can undermine the army's morale. The treatment of detainees is shocking, says Sergey Sobko.
Today, we witness the public detention of Ukrainian officers. They face a series of accusations related to the improper performance of their official duties. The manner in which the arrests and court proceedings occurred is striking. The attitude towards the officers is impressive. One hopes that the court will approach these cases objectively and thoughtfully, thoroughly investigating all causes and consequences, drawing the right conclusions in the interest of enhancing our combat capability, and that the goal is indeed to address issues and improve the military system rather than to find scapegoats for our defeats.
Condemnation of generals and officers during wartime for negligence and decision-making errors has become a pressing issue. The consequences can carry both positive and negative implications for the troops, the state, and the country as a whole. With the right approach, such condemnations could strengthen justice, but they could also weaken the front. On one hand, it serves as a signal of accountability to others, while on the other, it may undermine trust between the military and the state, decrease morale, and affect command effectiveness.
Regarding the negative aspects, firstly, the condemnation of commanders can significantly undermine morale, creating an atmosphere of fear among other officers and generals. Consequently, due to fears of criminal liability for possible mistakes, military leaders may avoid decisive actions that are so crucial today. This could diminish their initiative and willingness to take responsibility in critical situations.
It is essential to remember that war is an arena of constant uncertainty and chaos, where it is impossible to predict all consequences, and mistakes are inevitable. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military faced significant criticism due to failures; however, there were no large-scale trials against commanders. The higher command avoided the direct prosecution of generals and senior officers because the war strategy turned out to be flawed. Efforts were focused on analyzing mistakes to prevent their recurrence in the future. If we punish our officers for every erroneous decision, it may lead to a "freeze" effect, where commanders shy away from taking initiative due to fear of repercussions. This is particularly dangerous in a context where the Russians act aggressively and unpredictably, where weapons, methods of action, and tactics change so rapidly that the victor will be the one who adapts quickest to new conditions—namely, the one who is unafraid of making mistakes.
Secondly, military personnel may perceive such actions as injustice. This, in turn, will undermine trust in the justice system and the political leadership of the state.
Thirdly, during wartime, commanders and leaders are key figures, and any changes or dismissals can destabilize command chains, especially if there are no better-prepared replacements, which is indeed a problem we currently face.
Fourthly, the enemy can and will use these stories in their propaganda. This could become a powerful tool in their hands for demoralizing both our military and society.
Finally, condemnation based on insufficiently substantiated accusations can set a dangerous precedent and serve as an example of a "witch hunt." In military conditions, it is often very challenging to objectively assess whether a commander could have acted differently. Frequently, holding military personnel accountable may be driven by genuine crimes or political objectives. War is a time when the government faces significant pressure from society. In the search for "culprits," authorities may use courts as a tool to satisfy public opinion, even if it harms the military. An example of how politically motivated prosecution of the military can have catastrophic consequences is the Stalinist purges, during which a significant portion of the Red Army's command staff was eliminated. Many talented officers were repressed, which considerably weakened the country's combat capability in the early years of the war.
On the other hand, it is essential to note the following.
Firstly, accountability can demonstrate that even in difficult times, the rule of law prevails, and officials are held accountable for their actions or inactions.
Secondly, if it concerns actual negligence or criminal inaction, it can signal to other officers to act responsibly and honestly. At the same time, citizens demanding justice may feel that their demands are being recognized and that the state is acting in the interest of society. During the 2006 Lebanon War, the commander of the Israeli ground forces, Udi Adam, faced criticism for indecisiveness and ineffective leadership. Although he was not prosecuted, his resignation served as a lesson for other commanders: the system demonstrated that negligence or planning mistakes have consequences. This spurred reforms that strengthened Israel's defense capabilities. Ukraine is currently experiencing a historical moment where the effectiveness and transparency of its military system will determine its future. Therefore, if military leadership is held accountable for its actions, it will enhance public trust in the state and the army.
Thirdly and most importantly, again, with the right approach, if the process is transparent and fair, it can contribute to the improvement of the command system and reduce the risk of repeating mistakes. For instance, in many countries, military mistakes are analyzed after the conflict concludes, allowing events to be assessed without emotional burden. This helps distinguish criminal negligence from strategic miscalculations. During World War I, British General Douglas Haig faced widespread criticism for the enormous losses during the battles of the Somme and Passchendaele. He was accused of using ineffective, outdated tactics that cost hundreds of thousands of soldiers' lives. However, there were no subsequent prosecutions. Only after the war did the government evaluate his actions and recognize that some decisions, although controversial, were the only possible ones given the conditions of that time.
In the war against Russia for Ukraine's independence and existence, not only combat power but also the ability to effectively manage troops and make correct decisions is paramount. The capacity to learn from mistakes is critically important. The issue of weak managerial skills among some generals and senior officers is often due to deficiencies in military education and systemic problems that challenge the state and us. Accordingly, we must act in such situations only to strengthen the military, not to undermine it.
Problems of Military Education and Training
In many armies around the world, professional training of leaders (commanders) is the foundation of the military's combat effectiveness. Ukraine, like many other post-Soviet countries, inherited a military education system focused on Soviet approaches that often overlook flexibility, modern tactics, critical thinking, and initiative. The ongoing war since 2014, especially from 2022 onwards, has highlighted the urgent need to change these approaches.
Israel, being in a state of constant war, has made military education one of its priorities. In the Israeli army, commanders learn to operate autonomously, making decisions in conditions of uncertainty and resource scarcity. For example, Israeli officers systematically undergo quality training courses even during wars. An essential element is the exchange of experiences after every battle and operation to minimize the repetition of mistakes. Therefore, we need to implement a military education and training system that focuses on modern tactics, resource management in scarcity, and the development of initiative at all levels of command. We need to learn during wartime, continuously and effectively. We should regularly conduct training for commanders right on the front lines, where experience sharing and real situation analysis is possible. Especially important is utilizing NATO countries' experiences to renew training approaches and create a new "learning culture" in the army.
Working on Mistakes Rather than Punishing for Them
During wartime, even the best commanders can make mistakes, especially in conditions of resource scarcity or enemy numerical superiority. Mistakes should be analyzed, but punishment for them must not destroy the army. After the failed operation in Somalia in 1993 (the Battle of Mogadishu), the U.S. military command did not punish officers. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis was conducted, leading Americans to revise their tactical approaches to conducting special operations. This allowed them to avoid similar miscalculations in the future.
Regarding After-action reviews, only the lazy have not yet spoken about them. We urgently need to utilize this tool at all levels. After each battle and operation, create groups and commissions to analyze commanders' actions, determining the causes of successes and failures. As for criminal cases, they should only be initiated in cases of deliberate service negligence or treason, not due to miscalculations in complex conditions.
Lastly, but certainly not least, it is crucial to provide officers with resources, equipment, and information so they can successfully accomplish their tasks. A lack of coordination and low levels of interaction between units or even commands leads to a misunderstanding of the overall picture, which poses threats and results in insufficiently effective actions.
Strengthening Trust Between the Military and the State
Trust between military and political leadership is a fundamental foundation for success in war. If commanders fear political persecution, service investigations, and punishments for mistakes, it undermines the army's combat capability. During World War II, Winston Churchill, even in the most critical moments, did not destroy trust in generals. When British forces were defeated in France in 1940, Churchill did not blame the command but focused on consolidating efforts for the upcoming counter-offensive. Therefore, we should better concentrate our efforts on conveying to society the complexities of war. Political leadership must explain to people that mistakes during wartime are inevitable, but they do not equate to treason or negligence. It is also necessary to objectively analyze commanders' actions to understand miscalculations at the highest level without turning this into trials. Especially public trials, which demean the dignity of our warriors and give the enemy an opportunity to